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Abstract 
 
 
 
We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose 
preferences are additively separable. When these consumers trade in a sequence of 
markets, their time-inconsistency may introduce a non-convexity that gives them an 
incentive to trade lotteries. If there are many consumers, competitive equilibria with 
and without lotteries exist. The existence of symmetric equilibria may require 
lotteries. Symmetric equilibria that do not require lotteries are generically locally 
unique. Allocations that are Pareto efficient at the initial date are also renegotiation-
proof. Competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient in this sense, and for generic 
endowments, if and only if preferences are locally homothetic. For non-homothetic 
preferences, the introduction of lottery markets has an ambiguous impact on the 
equilibrium welfare of consumers at the initial date. 
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1. Introduction
There has been a recent upsurge of interest in models in which consumers have
present-biased time-inconsistent preferences. This interest is motivated in part by in-
trospection, by experiments, and by the possibility that certain types of behavior can
be more easily understood using such preferences.1 Much of the literature has taken
a partial equilibrium approach, focusing on deriving, at given prices, the implications
of time-inconsistency for the behavior of consumers.2 In this paper, we examine the
properties of competitive equilibria when consumers are time-inconsistent. Our aim
is to describe the extent to which classical results on the existence and eﬃciency of
competitive equilibria in an economy with a sequence of markets need to be modiÞed
when the usual requirement of time-consistency is dropped.
We consider a three-period exchange economy and adopt two important simplify-
ing assumptions. First, we take preferences to be additively separable across time and
states of the world. Second, we assume that all consumers discount future utilities
in the same way, although their period utility functions may diﬀer. A remarkable
implication of these assumptions is that allocations that are Pareto eﬃcient from
the perspective of consumers at the initial date remain Pareto eﬃcient at subsequent
dates. This implies that the set of initially Pareto eﬃcient allocations is the same as
the set of renegotiation-proof allocations.
A complete set of markets open only at the initial date can be used to implement
any allocation that is Pareto eﬃcient from the perspective of consumers at this date.
Since all choices are made at this initial date, time-inconsistency of preferences is
irrelevant. We are interested instead in an environment in which markets are open in
every period. We assume that a typical consumer correctly anticipates future prices
as well as his or her own future behavior. Just as in the case of time-consistent
preferences, this future behavior can be summarized by a value function deÞned
over wealth saved by the consumer at the initial date. However, because of time-
inconsistency, this value function need not be concave, even if the underlying period
utility functions are. As a result, the demand correspondences of individual consumers
may not be convex-valued. To guarantee existence of an equilibrium, we assume that
1Strotz (1956) and Phelps and Pollak (1968) are early authors who considered additively separable
preferences exhibiting time-inconsistency. Laibson (1997) shows that partially illiquid assets may
provide commitment to consumers with time-inconsistent preferences. Harris and Laibson (2001)
study the dynamic choices of a consumer with quasi-hyperbolic preferences facing a constant risk-
free interest rate and subject to borrowing constraints. Barro (1999), Krusell and Smith (1999),
and Krusell, Kurus¸çu and Smith (2001) consider a version of the standard Ramsey growth model
with time-inconsistent preferences. More generally, time-inconsistency has been used to model a
wide range of problems involving self-control. See for instance Benabou and Tirole (2002), Carrillo
and Mariotti (2000) and ODonoghue and Rabin (1999a, 1999b). Gul and Pesendorfer (1999, 2001)
propose a recursive approach to self-control problems.
2See, however, Kocherlakota (2001), Krusell, Kurus¸çu and Smith (2001), Krusell and Smith
(1999) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2000). But these papers do not allow for any heterogeneity in
preferences.
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there is a continuum of consumers.
The possibility of non-concave value functions means that the resulting compet-
itive equilibria may have to be asymmetric: identical consumers may be indiﬀerent
between several choices, and which choices they make is determined by the require-
ment that markets clear. We show that in such an equilibrium, price-taking consumers
at the initial date have an incentive to pool their resources and run a lottery over the
fraction of aggregate wealth each consumer receives at the second date.
To allow consumers at the initial date to exploit these perceived gains to trade,
we introduce an additional market in which lotteries are traded. Given such a mar-
ket, a symmetric equilibrium always exists, provided period utility functions are not
asymptotically risk-neutral. In an example, we show that asymmetric equilibria and
symmetric lottery equilibria can indeed occur. At the asymmetric equilibrium of an
economy without lottery markets, the incentives to trade lotteries are unambiguous.
But allowing such lotteries to be traded will aﬀect equilibrium prices, and these price
eﬀects can hurt consumers at the initial date. As a result, the eﬀect on welfare of
consumers at the initial date of allowing trade in lotteries is ambiguous. In some ex-
amples, opening lottery markets helps, and in others it hurts consumers at the initial
date.
The utility of a consumer at the initial date is aﬀected by the behavior of the same
consumer at all later dates. This can be viewed as an externality, and our examples
conÞrm that the competitive equilibrium allocation of an economy with a sequence of
markets, with or without lottery markets, need not be eﬃcient. There is, however, an
important special case in which the classical welfare theorems do apply to an economy
with a sequence of markets. This is the case of homothetic preferences analyzed in
Luttmer and Mariotti (2000).3 4 We show here that the condition of homotheticity
is necessary for the generic eﬃciency of the competitive equilibrium. We prove that
for nowhere locally homothetic preferences, and for generic endowments, the set of
competitive equilibria and the set of allocations that are eﬃcient from the perspective
of consumers at the initial date have an intersection that is of lower dimension than
either set. Time-inconsistency distorts intertemporal marginal rates of substitution by
a factor that depends on marginal propensities to consume. The linear consumption
functions implied by homothetic preferences ensure that this distortion is the same
across consumers, and this restores eﬃciency.
3This result does not even depend on the assumption of additive separability used in this paper.
See Luttmer and Mariotti (2000b).
4Kocherlakota (2001) uses logarithmic preferences. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium will
be eﬃcient from the perspective of consumers at the initial date when there is a sequence of markets,
just as it is when markets are only open at the initial date. But the intermediate case considered
in his papersome securities can only be traded at the initial date and cannot be borrowed against
at a later dategenerates a equilibrium that is not eﬃcient.
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2. Efficiency in an Exchange Economy
We consider a three-period exchange economy with a Þnite number, I, of consumer
types. There is a continuum of consumers of each type, and for notational simplicity
we take this continuum to be of unit measure for every type. A single good is available
for consumption in every period. For every i and t, a consumer of type i has positive
endowments ei,t of this good in period t. Aggregate endowments in period t are
denoted by et. A consumer of type i has preferences over non-negative consumption
sequences ci = (ci,1, ci,2, ci,3) given by:
Ui,1(ci) = ui(ci,1) + δ1ui(ci,2) + δ2ui(ci,3)
in period 1, and by:
Ui,2(ci) = ui(ci,2) + δ1ui(ci,3)
in period 2. The subjective discount factors δ1 and δ2 are positive, and the period
utility functions ui : R+ → R = R ∪ {−∞} are assumed to be strictly increasing,
continuous, and strictly concave. These preferences are time-inconsistent whenever
δ21 6= δ2, with a bias toward the present if δ21 < δ2. Note that, although the period
utility functions ui may vary across consumers, the discount factors δ1 and δ2 are the
same for all consumers.
Eﬃcient Allocations A (symmetric, non-random) allocation in this economy is
a vector c ∈ R3I+ of consumption sequences, one for each consumer type. An allo-
cation is feasible if aggregate consumption at every date does not exceed aggregate
endowments. Because preferences may change over time, there are several notions of
eﬃciency that can be useful.
DeÞnition 1 A feasible allocation c is:
(i) Weakly Pareto eﬃcient if there is no other feasible allocation c0 such that
Ui,t(c
0
i) ≥ Ui,t(ci) for all (i, t), and such that this inequality is strict for at
least one (i, t).
(ii) Date-t Pareto eﬃcient if there is no other feasible allocation c0 such that Ui,t(c0i) ≥
Ui,t(ci) for all i and such that this inequality is strict for at least one i.
(iii) Renegotiation-proof if it is date-2 Pareto eﬃcient and there is no other date-2
Pareto eﬃcient allocation c0 such that Ui,1(c0i) ≥ Ui,1(ci) for all i and such that
this inequality is strict for at least one i.
The three deÞnitions given here can be extended in the obvious way to asymmetric
or random allocations. It is easy to see that, because of the strict concavity of ui,
random allocations can never be weakly Pareto eﬃcient, date-t Pareto eﬃcient, or
renegotiation-proof.
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Beyond ruling out random allocations, weak Pareto eﬃciency imposes few restric-
tions on an allocation. Because preferences are additively separable and the horizon
is Þnite, any (non-random) allocation that exhausts aggregate resources at every date
is weakly Pareto eﬃcient, even when preferences are time-consistent.5 Date-1 Pareto
eﬃciency is the natural notion of eﬃciency when consumers can commit to a sequence
of consumption choices. When this is not the case, the set of renegotiation-proof al-
locations represents a notion of constrained eﬃciency: these allocations are eﬃcient
from the perspective of date-1 consumers, subject to the constraint that date-2 al-
locations are eﬃcient. Clearly, if an allocation is date-t eﬃcient for both t = 1 and
t = 2, then the allocation is renegotiation-proof. It turns out that all date-1 eﬃcient
allocations are date-2 eﬃcient.
Proposition 1 The sets of date-1 Pareto eﬃcient and renegotiation-proof allocations
coincide.
Proof. Let e = (e1, e2, e3), and consider the set of feasible date-1 utilities:
U1 =
(
U1 ∈ RI : ∃c ∈ R3I+ s.t.
IX
i=1
ci ≤ e and Ui,1(ci) ≥ Ui,1 ∀i = 1, . . . , I
)
.
Since the aggregate resource constraint is convex and the utility functions Ui,1 are
concave and continuous, U1 is a closed and convex set. Date-1 Pareto eﬃciency of an
allocation c ∈ R3I+ implies that c belongs to the boundary of U1. By the separating
hyperplane theorem, there exists λ ∈ RI \ {0} such that λ · U1(c) ≥ λ · U1 for all
U1 ∈ U1, and, since U1 −RI+ ⊂ U1, we must have λ ≥ 0. In particular, c solves:
max
c∈R3I+
(
IX
i=1
λiUi,1(ci) :
IX
i=1
ci ≤ e
)
. (1)
Since the resource constraints are independent across time and preferences are addi-
tively separable, and since the discount factors δ1 and δ2 are the same across con-
sumers, the solution to (1) can be obtained by solving:
max
ct∈RI+
(
IX
i=1
λiui(ci,t) :
IX
i=1
ci,t ≤ et
)
for all t. This in turn implies that c solves:
max
c∈R3I+
(
IX
i=1
λiUi,2(ci) :
IX
i=1
ci ≤ e
)
.
5This is no longer true if there is an inÞnite number of periods. For example, if there are two
suﬃciently patient types of consumers whose endowments oscillate in opposite directions, then it
can be weakly Pareto improving to smooth the allocation. In an economy with a Þnite number of
periods but multiple goods at every date, weak Pareto eﬃciency would only require that at any
particular date, marginal rates of substitution for the goods at that date are lined up.
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Therefore, since λ ≥ 0 and λ 6= 0, there exists no feasible allocation c0 such that
Ui,2(c
0
i) > Ui,2(ci) for all i. Using the fact that the ui are continuous and strictly
increasing one can verify that this implies that c is date-2 Pareto eﬃcient.
It is easy to extend this result to multi-period economies in which consumers of
type i have preferences at date t given by
PT−t
n=0 δnui(ci,t+n), with T possibly inÞnite.
Proposition 1 also holds under uncertainty if preferences after every history can be
represented by an expected utility function using subjective probabilities that are
updated using Bayes rule.6
Diﬀerent Discount Factors Things change when consumers have discount factors
δi,1 and δi,2 that are not the same for all i. Let c(λ) be a date-1 Pareto eﬃcient
allocation given a vector of Pareto weights λ for date-1 utilities. That is, c(λ) solves:
max
c∈R3I+
(
IX
i=1
λi (ui,1(ci) + δi,1ui(ci,2) + δi,2ui(ci,3)) :
IX
i=1
ci ≤ e
)
. (2)
For c(λ) to remain Pareto eﬃcient at date 2, it must be that (c2(λ), c3(λ)) solves:
max
(c2,c3)∈R2I++
(
IX
i=1
µi (ui(ci,2) + δi,1ui(ci,3)) :
IX
i=1
(ci,2, ci,3) ≤ (e2, e3)
)
(3)
for some vector of Pareto weights µ. Using (2)-(3) together with the fact that there is
a one-to-one relationship between eﬃcient allocations and vectors of Pareto weights,
it is not diﬃcult to check that the only circumstance in which this will be the case
is whenever the ratio δi,2/δ2i,1 is constant across consumers. This is automatically
satisÞed if consumers have time-consistent preferences. More generally, this ratio can
be seen as a measure of the consumers time-inconsistency. Thus date-1 Pareto eﬃ-
cient allocations are renegotiation-proof if and only if all consumers exhibit the same
degree of inconsistency, that is when their discount factors are given by βδi and βδ
2
i ,
for some common time-inconsistency parameter β. In multi-period economies, this
generalizes to the requirement that the discount factors of a type-i consumer are given
by β1δi, β2δ
2
i , β3δ
2
i , . . ., for all i.
3. Two Economies with a Sequence of Markets
The Second Welfare Theorem implies that date-1 eﬃcient allocations can be imple-
mented using competitive markets in which trade in one- and two-period bonds takes
place only at date 1. When preferences are time-consistent, one can use this to con-
struct an equivalent equilibrium for an economy with a sequence of markets in which
6An axiomatic foundation of such preferences can proceed mostly along the usual lines. To allow
for time-inconsistency and still obtain subjective probabilities that satisfy Bayes rule, one has to
assume that preferences are consistent across information sets.
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consumers can trade one-period bonds (Arrow (1964)). A consumption plan that is
feasible in one economy is feasible in the other, and time-consistency ensures that
consumers who make plans at one date will not want to revise them at a later date.
This last observation fails when preferences are time-inconsistent, and we therefore
need to study economies with a sequence of markets separately.
3.1. Markets
We consider two market structures: one with markets for one-period discount bonds
at dates 1 and 2, and another in which date-1 consumers can also trade in lotteries that
pay oﬀ in terms of date-2 consumption. Date-1 consumers may have an incentive to
use these lotteries because time-inconsistency can introduce a non-convexity in their
preferences over date-2 wealth.
Consumers face no constraints on borrowing, other than that they must be able
to pay oﬀ their debts at date 3. The sequence of bond markets allows consumers
to exchange consumption at any one date for consumption at any other date. The
price of date-t consumption in terms of some numeraire is denoted by pt and we write
p = (p1, p2, p3)
0. Of course, the price in terms of date-t consumption of a bond that
pays one unit of consumption at date t+ 1 is simply pt+1/pt. We normalize prices so
that p ∈ ∆3, the unit simplex of R3++.
As in Pollak (1968), we view the same consumer at diﬀerent dates as diﬀerent
decision makers. Taking prices as given, the date-1, -2, and date-3 incarnations of
a given consumer play a game. A trading strategy for the date-t incarnation of a
consumer is a decision how much to consume and save, andif there are lottery
marketswhat lottery to buy over next-period wealth, given any history. We require
these trading strategies to form a subgame perfect equilibrium of the intrapersonal
game played between the three incarnations of the same consumer.
3.2. The Date-2 Exchange Economy
At date 3, a consumer simply consumes his or her wealth, which consists of endow-
ments and maturing bonds. At date 2, this same consumer must choose how much
to consume and how many bonds to buy. Given non-negative wealth w2 and prices
p ∈ ∆3, a date-2 consumer of type i solves:
max
(c2,c3)∈R2+
{ui(c2) + δ1ui(c3)} (4)
subject to the budget constraint:
p2c2 + p3c3 ≤ p2w2.
Let ci,2(p, w2) and ci,3(p,w2) be the decision rules that solve (4) for various prices p
and wealth levels w2. The utility perceived by the date-1 consumer from these choices
is captured by a value function Vi deÞned by:
Vi(p,w2) = δ1ui(ci,2(p, w2)) + δ2ui(ci,3(p, w2)). (5)
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For given prices p, there is no guarantee that this value function will be concave
in date-2 wealth w2 if preferences are not time-consistent. This may give a date-1
consumer an incentive to use lotteries. In the absence of lottery markets, the non-
concavity of Vi(p, ·) can cause the set of optimal consumption and savings choices of
a date-1 consumer to be non-convex.
3.3. Bond Markets Only
Consider Þrst the case where no lottery markets exist for date-2 wealth. By trading
in one-period bonds, a date-1 consumer of type i with wealth w1 can choose levels of
date-1 consumption and date-2 wealth that solve:
max
(c1,w2)∈R2+
{ui(c1) + Vi(p,w2)} (6)
subject to the budget constraint:
p1c1 + p2w2 ≤ p1w1. (7)
The set of solutions to this decision problem is denoted by [ci,1, wi,2](p, w1). For any
price vector p ∈ ∆3, let wi,1(p) denote date-1 wealth of a consumer of type i:
wi,1(p) =
1
p1
3X
t=1
ptei,t. (8)
Given prices p and date-1 choices (c1, w2), the consumption allocation of a consumer
of type i is given by:
di(p, c1, w2) =
 c1ci,2(p, w2)
ci,3(p, w2)
 . (9)
By combining the solution to (6)-(7) with (8) and (9) one can construct the demand
correspondence of a consumer of type i:
Di(p) = di(p, [ci,1, wi,2](p, wi,1(p))). (10)
Note that the consumption vector selected from Di(p) is determined by the point in
[ci,1, wi,2](p, wi,1(p)) chosen by the date-1 incarnation of a consumer of type i. Thus a
date-1 consumer of type i will be indiﬀerent between all points in Di(p). This implies
that the average demand of consumers of type i is given by the convex hull co[Di(p)].
A non-extreme point of co[Di(p)] is obtained by having appropriate fractions of the
consumers of type i choose each of the points in Di(p).
The Boundary Behavior of Demand The proof of the existence of a competitive
equilibrium that we construct below makes use of the following boundary property
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of Di(p): if p approaches the boundary of ∆3, then the demand for at least one of
the goods grows without bound. If preferences are time consistent, then Di(p) is the
outcome of a decision problem. The desired boundary property of demand is then a
standard implication of strict monotonicity of preferences and the assumption that
endowments are strictly positive (see Debreu (1982, Lemma 4)). We need to extend
Debreus lemma to the outcomes of intrapersonal games.
Lemma 1 Let {pn} be a sequence of price vectors in∆3 that converges to some price
vector at the boundary of ∆3. Then the sequence
©
infz∈Di(pn) kzk
ª
goes to +∞.
The proof for the cases in which the price of date-1 consumption goes to zero is a
direct consequence of Debreus lemma. The proof for the cases in which the price of
date-1 consumption remains bounded away from zero relies on Þrst-order necessary
conditions for the decision problems of the date-1 and date-2 consumers.7 The Þrst-
order conditions for the date-2 consumer include:
D−ui(ci,2(p, w2))/p2 ≥ δ1D+ui(ci,3(p, w2))/p3 (11)
δ1D−ui(ci,3(p, w2))/p3 ≥ D+ui(ci,2(p,w2))/p2 (12)
as long as ci,2(p, w2) > 0 and ci,3(p, w2) > 0, respectively. The fact that the date-2
consumer could choose to spend any incremental wealth only on date-2 consumption
or only on date-3 consumption implies the following envelope condition:
Dw+Fi(p, w2)/p2 ≥ max {D+ui(ci,2(p, w2))/p2, δ1D+ui(ci,3(p, w2))/p3} , (13)
where Fi(p,w2) is the value function for a date-2 consumer of type i. The date-
1 consumer does not have a convex decision problem, and [ci,1, wi,2] is generally a
correspondence. Nevertheless, for any (c1, w2) ∈ [ci,1, wi,2](p, wi,1(p)) it must be that:
D−ui(c1)/p1 ≥ Dw+Vi(p, w2)/p2 (14)
as long as c1 > 0. Otherwise, the date-1 consumer could certainly improve utility by
reducing date-1 consumption by a small amount. Bounds on the marginal rates of
substitution between date-1 consumption and date-2 or date-3 consumption can be
constructed from (13)-(14) if we can relate D+wFi and D
+
wVi. Observe that:
Vi(p, w2) = δ1
µ
Fi(p, w2) +
µ
δ2
δ21
− 1
¶
δ1ui(ci,3(p,w2))
¶
=
δ2
δ1
µ
Fi(p, w2) +
µ
δ21
δ2
− 1
¶
ui(ci,2(p, w2))
¶
. (15)
7The concavity of ui implies the existence of left and right derivatives, D−ui and D+ui. For any
function f deÞned on ∆3 × R+ with values in R ∪ {−∞} and Þnite except possibly at (p, 0), let
Dw+f(p,w) = lim supε↓0 (f(p,w + ε)− f(p,w))/ε.
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One implication of the additive separability of preferences and the concavity of ui
is that date-2 consumption and date-3 consumption are normal goods for the date-2
consumer. Therefore:
Dw+Vi(p,w2) ≥ βDw+Fi(p, w2), (16)
where β is either δ1 or δ2/δ1, depending on whether δ2/δ21 is larger or smaller than
one. The Þrst-order conditions (11)-(12) and (14) and the envelope condition (13)
together with the bound (16) imply that for t = 2 and t = 3, infzt∈Di,t(p) |zt| goes
to inÞnity if pt goes to zero. For example, if p2 goes to zero while p1 and p3 remain
bounded away from zero, then D+ui(ci,2(p,w2))/p2 would go to inÞnity if ci,2(p, w2)
did not grow without bound. It follows from (12) that date-3 consumption must
go to zero, and from (13)-(16) that date-1 consumption must go to zero. But then
the total value of consumer is consumption would go to zero. This contradicts the
fact that p1wi,1(p) remains bounded away from zero. Similar contradictions can be
derived from (11)-(16) if p3 goes to zero or if p2 and p3 both go to zero.
Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium A competitive equilibrium is given by
prices p ∈ ∆3 such that zero is an element of the value at p of the aggregate excess
demand correspondence implied by (10):
0 ∈
IX
i=1
(co[Di(p)]− ei).
Under our assumptions on the utility functions ui, the decision problem of a date-2
consumer is completely standard. The decision rules ci,2 and ci,3 are continuous on
∆3×R+, which implies that di as given by (9) is continuous on ∆3×R2++, and it is not
diﬃcult to see that for every p ∈ ∆3, Vi(p, ·) is also continuous on R++. Furthermore,
Vi(p, ·) exhibits the same behavior at zero as ui.
The demand correspondenceDi is constructed using the composition of the contin-
uous function di with [ci,1, wi,2] and the continuous function wi,1 in (8). The Maximum
Theorem implies that [ci,1, wi,2] is a non-empty, upper-hemicontinuous and compact-
valued correspondence on ∆3 × R++. It follows that Di is upper-hemicontinuous
on ∆3, with non-empty and compact values (Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem
16.23)). But then co[Di] is also upper-hemicontinuous on ∆3, with non-empty convex
and compact values (Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.35)).
The excess demand correspondence obtained by aggregating across types will
again be upper-hemicontinuous and convex-valued. As usual, it is bounded below
by the aggregate endowments and satisÞes Walras Law. The excess demand corre-
spondence inherits the boundary property of Di(p) shown in Lemma 1. One can now
apply a theorem of Debreu (1982, Theorem 8) to establish the following result.
Proposition 2 There exists a competitive equilibrium.
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This proposition continues to apply if consumers of diﬀerent types have diﬀerent
subjective discount factors.
The Incentive to Gamble Suppose p is a vector of equilibrium prices at which
date-1 consumers of type i are indiﬀerent between two distinct pairs (c1, w2) and
(c01, w
0
2). Suppose that a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) chooses (c1, w2) while the remainder
chooses (c01, w
0
2). Now imagine that after trading in bonds, consumers of type i could
get together at date-1 and re-allocate their collective resources. One possible re-
allocation would give each of them θc1 + (1 − θ)c01 to consume at date 1, together
with a lottery that delivers w2 units of date-2 wealth with probability θ and w02 with
probability 1 − θ. The expected date-1 utility of consumers of type i under this
alternative allocation will be strictly greater than under the equilibrium allocation:
ui(θc1 + (1− θ)c01) + θVi(p, w2) + (1− θ)Vi(p,w02) >
θ [ui(c1) + Vi(p,w2)] + (1− θ) [ui(c01) + Vi(p, w02)] = ui(c1) + Vi(p, w2), (17)
by the strict concavity of ui and the indiﬀerence between (c1, w2) and (c01, w
0
2). In
fact, the date-1 consumers of type i can do even better by choosing a lottery that
maximizes their expected utility of date-2 wealth.
It is not diﬃcult to see that if the date-1 consumers of type i can re-allocate their
resources in this way, they have an incentive to engage in further bond trades at the
supposed equilibrium prices p. This suggests that an equilibrium in which diﬀerent
consumers of the same type make diﬀerent choices may not be very stable.
There is a further reason why such an equilibrium might not be stable. Although
the date-1 consumers of some type may in equilibrium be indiﬀerent between two
choices, the date-2 incarnations of these same consumers will typically not be in-
diﬀerent. Suppose now that date-1 consumers make their choices lexicographically:
maximize date-1 utility, and when indiﬀerent select a choice that maximizes date-2
utility. All date-1 consumers of one type will then typically want to make the same
choice, and this would break the proposed equilibrium.
3.4. Bonds and Lotteries
Consumers at date 1 can now also trade in lotteries with payoﬀs in terms of date-
2 consumption. A lottery with distribution µ trades at the actuarially fair price
of (p2/p1)
R
cdµ(c) units of date-1 consumption. A date-1 consumer of type i with
wealth w1 then chooses date-1 consumption and a lottery over date-2 wealth to solve:8
max
c1∈R+,µ∈∆(R+)
½
ui(c1) +
Z
Vi(p, w2) dµ(w2)
¾
(18)
subject to the budget constraint:
p1c1 + p2
Z
w2 dµ(w2) ≤ p1w1. (19)
8The set of Borel probability measures over a complete metric space X is denoted by ∆(X), and
is endowed with the usual topology of weak convergence.
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Because of the possible non-concavity of Vi(p, ·), there may be multiple solutions
to this decision problem. Note however that the strict concavity of ui does imply
that for every (p,w1) ∈ ∆3 × R++ there can be at most one optimal level of date-1
consumption. We denote this by ci,1(p, w1) and write µi(·|p, w1) for the set of lotteries
that solve (18)-(19).
For any price vector p ∈ ∆3, date-1 wealth of a consumer of type i is again given
by (8). The expected consumption choices of a consumer of type i are therefore:
c¯i,1(p) = ci,1(p,wi,1(p)) (20)
at date 1, and: ·
c¯i,2(p)
c¯i,3(p)
¸
=
Z ·
ci,2(p, w2)
ci,3(p, w2)
¸
dµi(w2|p, wi,1(p)) (21)
at dates 2 and 3. (The right-hand side of (21) is interpreted as the set of values in R2+
obtained by integrating against all of the probability distributions in µi(·|p, wi,1(p)).)
The Date-1 Decision Problem To show that a symmetric lottery equilibrium
always exists, we must impose a boundary condition on preferences that was not
needed to establish the existence of possibly asymmetric no-lottery equilibria.
Assumption U The utility functions ui are such that either ui is bounded below
and limc→∞ ui(c)/c = 0, or cD+ui(c) remains bounded as c goes to +∞.
The condition that ui(c)/c goes to zero as c increases without bound implies that
consumers are not approximately risk neutral at high levels of consumption.9 The
value function Vi inherits this property of ui: as w gets large, Vi(p, w)/w goes to zero.
A diﬃculty in characterizing the solution to the decision problem of a date-1
consumer is the fact that the set of lotteries available to a date-1 consumer is not
compact. In particular, a date-1 consumer could use a lottery that assigns a positive
probability to arbitrarily high levels of date-2 wealth. The fact that Vi(p, w)/w goes
to zero as w gets large ensures that this will never be optimal. This implies that one
can restrict attention to lotteries with a support contained in some compact subset
of R+. The boundary condition at zero ensures that one can take the support of
an optimal lottery to be a compact subset of R+ on which Vi(p, ·) is continuous. To
prove that the choices of a date-1 consumer vary continuously with prices, we need
this last observation to hold in some sense uniformly in (p, w1). The following lemma
asserts that this is indeed the case. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption U holds, and consider any compact P in ∆3 and
Wi,1 in R++. Then there are compact subsets Ci and Wi,2 of R+ (of R++ if ui
9This is the assumption used by Kehoe, Levine and Prescott (2001) in the context of a private
information economy with lottery markets.
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is not bounded below) such that any solution to the date-1 problem (18)-(19) is in
Ci ×∆(Wi,2) for every (p,w1) in P ×Wi,1.
Lotteries Versus Deterministic Allocations A minimal requirement for a date-1
consumer of type i to prefer a lottery µ over saving a deterministic amount w¯(µ) =R
w dµ(w) is:
Vi(p, w¯(µ)) ≤ δ1ui(c¯i,2(p, µ)) + δ2ui(c¯i,3(p, µ)). (22)
where c¯i,t(p, µ) represents the mean of ci,t(p,w) when w is generated by a lottery
µ. At the very least, the date-1 continuation utility of expected consumption under
the lottery must exceed the date-1 continuation utility of the consumption choices
induced by saving w¯(µ). Otherwise the uncertainty of the lottery can only make the
date-1 consumer worse oﬀ.
To gain some further insight in the properties of optimal lotteries, consider the
case of present bias (δ2/δ
2
1 > 1.) Using the Þrst part of (15) and the fact that Fi is
concave in wealth, one can verify that:Z
Vi(p, w) dµ(w) ≤ Vi(p, w¯(µ)) +
µ
δ2
δ21
− 1
¶
δ21 [ui(c¯i,3(p, µ))− ui(ci,3(p, w¯(µ)))] .
If the date-1 consumer weakly prefers a lottery µ to saving w¯(µ), then the second
term in this expression must be non-negative. In these circumstances, therefore,
ci,2(p, w¯(µ)) ≥ c¯i,2(p, µ) and ci,3(p, w¯(µ)) ≤ c¯i,3(p, µ). In the case of future bias, one
can use the second part of (15) to verify that both these inequalities are reversed.
The only reason the date-1 consumer might want to use a lottery is to counter the
biases generated by the preferences of the date-2 consumer. In the case of present
bias, the date-2 consumer consumes too much at date 2, and an actuarially fair
lottery can only be advantageous if expected date-2 consumption is lower than it
would be if the date-1 consumer chose to save the same amount deterministically.
The date-2 budget constraint implies that p3[c¯i,3(p, µ) − ci,3(p, w¯(µ))] is equal to
p2[ci,2(p, w¯(µ)) − c¯i,2(p, µ)]. In the case of present bias, both these quantities are
positive if µ is strictly preferred to w¯(µ). We can therefore also write (22) as:
δ2 [ui(c¯i,3(p, µ))− ui(ci,3(p, w¯(µ)))]
p3[c¯i,3(p, µ)− ci,3(p, w¯(µ))] ≥
δ1 [ui(ci,2(p, w¯(µ)))− ui(c¯i,2(p, µ))]
p2[ci,2(p, w¯(µ))− c¯i,2(p, µ)] (23)
whenever the lottery µ is strictly preferred to saving w¯(µ) deterministically. The
reverse holds in the case of future bias. We shall use (23) below to study the properties
of expected consumption as relative prices go to zero.
The Boundary Behavior of Demand If c¯i,1(p) is positive, then it must be that
the date-1 consumer could not have done better by reducing date-1 consumption by
some small positive ε/p1. One possible use of the resulting increment in savings would
have been to shift the distribution µi(·|p,wi,1(p)) to the right by ε/p2. Together with
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(15), the normality of date-2 and date-3 consumption, and the envelope condition
(13) for the date-2 problem, this implies that:
D−ui(c¯i,1(p))
p1
≥ β
Z
D+ui(ci,2(p, w))
p2
dµi(w|p,wi,1(p)) (24)
as long as ci,1(p) is positive. As in (16), β is either δ1 or δ2/δ1, depending on whether
δ2/δ
2
1 is larger or smaller than one. DeÞne:
w¯i,2(p) =
Z
w dµi(w|p, wi,1(p))
and consider what happens if p2 goes to zero and p1 and p3 remain bounded away
from zero.
Suppose that c¯i,2(p) remains bounded. This implies that µi(·|p, wi,1(p)) must
assign probabilities that remain bounded away from zero to some interval of wealth
on which ci,2(p,w) is bounded. The right-hand side of (24) must therefore grow
without bound as p2 gets small. This yields an immediate contradiction if marginal
utility at zero is bounded. Alternatively, it implies that date-1 consumption must
go to zero. In that case, p2w¯i,2(p) also remains bounded away from zero. It then
follows from the Þrst-order conditions of the date-2 problem that ci,2(p, w¯i,2(p)) must
grow without bound. If preferences exhibit future bias, this yields an immediate
contradiction, since c¯i,2(p) ≥ ci,2(p, w¯i,2(p)). It remains to consider the case of present
bias. There are three subcases to distinguish.
Suppose Þrst that ui is bounded below but not above. Since ci,2(p, w¯i,2(p)) grows
without bound it follows that Vi(p, w¯i,2(p)) grows without bound. At the same time,
c¯i,2(p) and c¯i,3(p) are supposed to remain bounded. This implies a violation of (22)
for any optimal lottery.
Next, suppose that ui is bounded above. This implies that cD+ui(c) goes to zero
as c gets large. The Þrst-order conditions (11)-(12) of the date-2 decision problem
then imply that p2ci,2(p, w¯i,2(p)) must go to zero, and that ci,3(p, w¯i,2(p)) remains
bounded away from zero. Since ci,2(p, w¯i,2(p)) grows without bound and c¯i,2(p) is
supposed to remain bounded, this will eventually violate (23) for any optimal lottery.
Finally, suppose that ui is unbounded below and that cD+ui(c) remains bounded
as c gets large. If the date-1 consumer chooses deterministic date-2 wealth levels w2 so
that p2w2 remains bounded away from zero, then the Þrst-order conditions (11)-(12)
of the date-2 problem imply that ci,2(p, w2) grows without bound and that ci,3(p, w2)
remains bounded away from zero. Since p1wi,1(p) remains bounded away from zero,
this means that the date-1 consumer can guarantee a level of utility that is bounded
below at all prices. On the other hand, the fact that date-1 consumption c¯i,1(p) must
go to zero if c¯i,2(p) remains bounded implies that choosing a lottery for which average
date-2 consumption remains bounded generates utility that shrinks down to −∞.
This cannot be optimal.
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Using similar lines of reasoning for other relative prices that go to zero, one can
establish the following lemma.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption U holds, and let {pn} be a sequence of price
vectors in ∆3 that converges to some price vector at the boundary of ∆3. Then the
sequence
©
infz∈c¯i(pn) kzk
ª
goes to +∞.
Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium We focus on showing the existence of
symmetric equilibria in which all consumers of a given type make the same choices.
This means that the aggregate demand correspondence is given by the sum over types
i of (20)-(21). A competitive equilibrium is given by prices p ∈ ∆3 such that zero is
an element of the value at p of the aggregate excess demand correspondence implied
by (20)-(21):
0 ∈
IX
i=1
(c¯i(p)− ei).
Consider any P ×Wi,1 and associated Ci and Wi,2 as in Lemma 2. We can restrict
the choices of a date-1 consumer of type i to Ci×∆(Wi,2). Subject to this restriction,
the correspondence that assigns budget-feasible consumption choices and lotteries to
elements of P ×Wi,1 is then non-empty, compact-valued and continuous. It follows
from the Maximum Theorem that (ci,1, µi) is an upper-hemicontinuous correspon-
dence on P ×Wi,1 with non-empty and compact values. Clearly, wi,1 as deÞned in
(8) is continuous on P . Thus c¯i,1 as given by (20) is continuous on P . Expected
demand for date-2 and date-3 consumption (c¯i,2, c¯i,3) is deÞned as the composition
of the function µ 7→ R [ci,2(p,w2), ci,3(p, w2)]0 dµ(w2), which is continuous on ∆(Wi,2)
since the decision rules ci,2 and ci,3 are continuous on P × Wi,2, with the upper-
hemicontinuous correspondence (p,w1) 7→ µi(·|p, w1) and the continuous function
p 7→ (p, wi,1(p)). It follows that (c¯i,2, c¯i,3) must be an upper-hemicontinuous corre-
spondence on P (Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.23)). Moreover, it is not
diﬃcult to see that this correspondence has non-empty convex and compact values.
Using the boundary property of c¯i shown in Lemma 3, the proof of the following
proposition now proceeds exactly as in the case of no-lottery equilibria.
Proposition 3 If consumers have utility functions that satisfy Assumption U, then
there exists a competitive equilibrium.
Again, Proposition 3 continues to apply if consumers of diﬀerent types have diﬀerent
subjective discount factors.
3.5. A Lottery Example
To verify that both asymmetric equilibria without lotteries and symmetric equilibria
with lotteries can occur, consider an economy with only one type of consumer whose
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period utility function is:
u(c) =
Z c
0
exp(−x2) dx.
(We omit the type-subscripts in this section.) Note that −cD2u(c)/Du(c) = c2, and
so the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion is close to zero for low levels of consumption.
Suppose δ1 = .1, δ2 = .9 and p3/p2 = .05. The value function V (p, ·) and the convex
hull of its epigraph are shown in Figure 1. For levels of date-2 wealth below w∗, the
consumer chooses c2 = 0. This generates a kink in the value function at w∗, something
that would not be possible if preferences were time-consistent. Note that V (p, ·) has
the shape used by Friedman and Savage (1948) to interpret evidence suggesting that
consumers at low levels of wealth buy insurance and gamble at the same time.
Figure 1
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V (p,w) = δ1u(c2(p, w)) + δ2u(c3(p, w))
It is not diﬃcult to construct an economy in which the value function shown in Figure
1 is part of the competitive equilibrium. Take some θ ∈ (0, 1) and any e1 > 0, and let
et = θct(p, w∗) + (1− θ)ct(p, w∗) for t = 2, 3. The price of a date-1 discount bond is
p2/p1 = DV (p, w
∗)/ exp (−e21). In equilibrium, everyone consumes their endowments
at date 1 and chooses to hold a lottery that pays w∗−(p2e2+p3e3)/p2 with probability
θ and w∗ − (p2e2 + p3e3)/p2 with probability 1 − θ. Given prices, these choices are
optimal and markets clear by construction.
For certain endowments, there is no symmetric equilibrium in which no lotter-
ies are used. The price of a discount bond at date 2 would have to be p3/p2 =
δ1 exp(−(e23 − e22)) in such an equilibrium. But for θ = .5 and endowments e2 and
e3 constructed as above, (p2e2 + p3e3)/p2 turns out to be in the convex range of the
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value function V (p, ·). The asymmetric no-lottery equilibrium for the same economy
with e1 = .15 is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2
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It turns out that date-1 utility in the lottery equilibrium is slightly higher than date-1
utility in the no-lottery equilibrium. Thus the existence of lottery markets makes the
date-1 consumers better oﬀ. But the diﬀerence in date-1 utilities is smaller than that
suggested by (17). While date-1 consumption is the same for all consumers in the
lottery equilibrium, equilibrium prices are such that the dispersion of their date-2 and
date-3 consumption is larger than in the no-lottery equilibrium. It can be veriÞed
that for alternative parameters this can overturn the eﬀect of (17) and reverse the
utility comparison between the two equilibria. It is therefore not possible to conclude
that either lottery equilibria or no-lottery equilibria will always be better in terms of
date-1 preferences. Note however that asymmetric no-lottery equilibria are weakly
Pareto eﬃcient, while symmetric lottery equilibria are not.
4. Smooth Preferences
We want to know under what circumstances competitive equilibria are date-1 Pareto
eﬃcient. Clearly, this will not be the case for asymmetric equilibria, or when lotteries
are used. In symmetric equilibria in which no lotteries are used, more can be said
about the properties of a competitive equilibrium when we assume that the utility
functions ui are suﬃciently smooth.
Assumption S The utility functions ui have continuous derivatives up to any order
on R++, and limc↓0Dui(c) = +∞ .
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4.1. Eﬃcient Allocations
Proposition 1 together with Assumption S implies that for a vector of aggregate
endowments e, the set of interior date-1 Pareto eﬃcient allocations is given by those
c that for some λ ∈ RI++ and p ∈ R3++ satisfy the marginal conditions:
λiDui(ci,t) = pt (25)
and feasibility conditions:
IX
i=1
ci,t = et, (26)
for all i and t. We can take λ to be in the unit simplex ∆I of RI++. Let P be the
set of pairs (e, c) of aggregate endowments and consumption allocations that satisfy
(25)-(26).
As deÞned in (25)-(26), P is parameterized by pairs (e,λ) of aggregate endowments
and Pareto weights. It will be more convenient below to parameterize P instead using
the vector of aggregate endowments e, together with a feasible allocation ct at one
particular date t. To construct such a parameterization, consider some (et,λ) in
R++×∆I and solve the date-t version of (25)-(26) for (et, ct). This deÞnes a function
g that maps R++ × ∆I into the set F that consists of pairs (et, ct) that satisfy the
feasibility constraint (26). The inverse of this function is given by (et, l(ct)), where:
li(ct) =
Ã
IX
j=1
1
Duj(cj,t)
!−1
1
Dui(ci,t)
for each i. The following lemma is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 4 The function g : R++ ×∆I → F is a diﬀeomorphism.
Take a vector (e, ct) such that (et, ct) ∈ F , and deÞne:
(es, cs) = g(es, l(ct))
for all s = 1, 2, 3. This deÞnes a map ϕt that takes any (et, ct, e−t) from Θ = F ×R2++
and maps it into P. The fact that g is a diﬀeomorphism implies that ϕt : Θ → P is
a diﬀeomorphism as well. Clearly, Θ is a manifold of dimension I +2, and so P must
be too. Given aggregate endowments, the manifold of Pareto eﬃcient allocations is,
as expected, of dimension I − 1.
4.2. Equilibrium Allocations
Fix some price vector p ∈ R3++. Under Assumption S, the decisions of a date-2
consumer of type i with positive wealth w2 are fully characterized by the date-2
budget constraint and the usual Þrst-order condition:
p3
p2
=
δ1Dui(ci,3(p, w2))
Dui(ci,2(p,w2))
. (27)
17
Moreover, for a Þxed p, the decision rules ci,2(p, ·) and ci,3(p, ·) are diﬀerentiable
functions of wealth. Diﬀerentiating (27) and the date-2 budget constraint with respect
to w2, one can verify that DwVi(p, w2) must be given by:
DwVi(p,w2) = fi(ci,2(p, w2), ci,3(p, w2))Dui(ci,2(p, w2)), (28)
where the function fi is deÞned as:
fi(x, y) =
δ1
[Dui(x)]
2
D2ui(x)
+ δ2
[Dui(y)]
2
D2ui(y)
[Dui(x)]2
D2ui(x)
+ δ1
[Dui(y)]2
D2ui(y)
.
Note that in the case of time-consistent preferences, this expression reduces to δ1, as
expected from (28) and the envelope condition of consumer is date-2 maximization
problem. If a date-1 consumer of type i with wealth w1 chooses not to use lotteries,
then his consumption and wealth choices must satisfy the date-1 budget constraint
and the usual Þrst-order condition:
p2
p1
=
DwVi(p, w2)
Dui(ci,1(p,w1))
. (29)
Any feasible consumption allocation that satisÞes (27)-(29) for all consumers i and
some prices p is a candidate for an equilibrium allocation without lotteries. Such an
allocation will be a competitive equilibrium for some distribution of endowments if
no consumer can do better using an actuarially fair lottery.
A convenient way to describe the set of candidate equilibrium allocations is ob-
tained by deÞning:
mi(ci) =
 Dui(ci,1)fi(ci,2, ci,3)Dui(ci,2)
fi(ci,2, ci,3)Dui(ci,3)
 .
Given aggregate endowments e, a feasible allocation c that is part of a competitive
equilibrium without lotteries must for some λ ∈ ∆I and p ∈ R3++ satisfy:
λimi,t(ci) = pt (30)
for all i and t. Because Þrst-order conditions need not be suﬃcient, some of the feasible
allocations admitted by (30) may not correspond to an equilibrium. It turns out that
competitive equilibria without lotteries have standard local uniqueness properties.
Proposition 4 Except for economies with endowments in a set of measure zero,
symmetric competitive equilibria without lotteries are locally unique.
The collection of (e, c) such that c is a symmetric competitive equilibrium allocation
given aggregate endowments e is contained in a manifold of dimension I + 2.
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4.3. Eﬃcient Equilibrium Allocations
A comparison of (25) and (30) shows that competitive equilibria are eﬃcient if and
only if the fi(ci,2, ci,3) are the same across consumers. By adding this restriction
to the conditions (25)-(26) for eﬃciency, we can determine which of the eﬃcient
allocations could potentially be decentralized as equilibrium allocations. From now
on, we shall assume that preferences are time-inconsistent. Adding the restriction
that the fi(ci,2, ci,3) coincide to the deÞnition of an eﬃcient allocation is therefore
equivalent to adding the requirement that for some ξ > 0 and all i:
D2ui(ci,3)
D2ui(ci,2)
= ξ. (31)
Relative to the deÞnition of P, this adds I additional restrictions and the new vari-
able ξ. Since P is an (I + 2)-dimensional manifold, this suggests that the set of
eﬃcient equilibrium allocations is 3-dimensional. For given aggregate endowments,
this would imply that there are only isolated points at which the equilibrium and
eﬃcient allocations coincide.
Whether or not this is indeed the case depends on whether the equations (31)
are locally independent of the eﬃciency conditions (25)-(26). The following three
examples show why this need not be true.
Example 1 First, if ui(c) = (c1−σ− 1)/(1−σ) for some σ > 0 and all i, then (31) is
implied by the eﬃciency conditions (25)-(26). This implies that competitive equilibria
are in fact eﬃcient. For these preferences, the fact that the Dui(ci,3)/Dui(ci,2) are
the same across consumers implies that consumption growth between dates 2 and 3
is the same for all consumers. In turn, this implies that D2ui(ci,3)/D2ui(ci,2) is also
the same across consumers, which makes (31) redundant. Thus, in particular, the
linear competitive equilibrium studied in Luttmer and Mariotti (2000) is eﬃcient.
Example 2 Alternatively, consider arbitrary utility functions ui but suppose that
e2 = e3. Then eﬃciency in the 2-period exchange economy that starts at date 2
requires that ci,2 = ci,3 for all consumers. Constant consumption across time for all
consumers again makes (31) redundant.
Example 3 A third example arises when consumers are identical and have identical
endowments. In this case, if no lotteries are used, then a symmetric equilibrium would
clearly be eﬃcient, although one need not necessarily exist.
We shall show that these examples of eﬃciency are special, either because of homo-
theticity, or because of non-generic endowments. If preferences are nowhere locally
homothetic, then for generic endowments, condition (31) will be independent of the
eﬃciency conditions (25)-(26).
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4.4. Critical Points
In order to compare eﬃcient and equilibrium allocations, we need to rule out two
types of critical points.
Local Homotheticity First, we rule out cases in which preferences are locally
homothetic. This corresponds to situations in which the ratio:
si(x) =
D3ui(x)Dui(x)
[D2ui(x)]2
is constant over some range, i.e., preferences exhibit locally linear risk tolerance.
Hence the following assumption.
Assumption Z The utility functions ui are such that Dsi is zero on a closed set of
measure zero.
A weaker version of Assumption Z would require that the set of points at which
Dsi vanishes is nowhere dense in R++. The results derived below hold under this
alternative assumption provided measure zero is replaced by nowhere dense and
closed in all the statements below. DeÞne, for every t:
At =
(
(et, ct, e−t) ∈ Θ :
IY
i=1
Dsi(ci,t) = 0
)
,
and:
Bt =
(
(e, c) ∈ P :
IY
i=1
Dsi(ci,t) = 0
)
.
For every t, we have ϕ−1t (Bt) ⊂ At. Assumption Z implies that At has measure zero
in Θ. Since ϕt is a diﬀeomorphism, it then follows that Bt has measure zero in P , for
every t. Thus, leaving out points from the eﬃcient manifold at which some Dsi(ci,t)
vanishes amounts to leaving out a set of points that is of measure zero in the eﬃcient
manifold. Intuitively, the fact that ϕt is a diﬀeomorphism implies that the eﬃcient
manifold has no tangent spaces of the form {(e, c) : ci,t = 0}. The fact that Bt has
measure zero in P follows naturally from this and Assumption Z.
For each i, let Ci be the set of points where Dsi is not equal to zero, and let C be
the Cartesian product of the Ci. Write P∗ for the intersection of P with R3++ × C3,
and Θ∗ for the intersection of Θ with R++ × C ×R2++. Since the Dsi are continuous
it follows that C is a smooth submanifold of RI++, of the same dimension. Similarly,
P∗ and Θ∗ are submanifolds of P and Θ, respectively, and of the same dimension as
P and Θ. As a result of Assumption Z, P∗ diﬀers from P by a closed set of measure
zero. For every t, ϕt : Θ
∗ → P∗ is again a diﬀeomorphism.
Further Critical Points It turns out that eliminating points of the consumption
spaces where preferences are locally homothetic is not enough to get our genericity
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result. By focusing on points in C we can eliminate some additional critical points
from the commodity space without eliminating non-negligible pieces from P . For
each i, deÞne ri : R3++ × C3 → R by:
ri(e, c) = si(ci,2)− si(ci,3),
and consider the function Ri : Θ∗ → R deÞned as:
Ri(θ) = ri(ϕ1(θ)).
The following lemma is proved in the Appendix.
Lemma 5 For each i, zero is a regular value of Ri.
Now, recall that Θ∗ is a submanifold of Θ of the same dimension as Θ, i.e., I + 2.
Since zero is a regular value of Ri, the Preimage Theorem implies that the zero set
of Ri is a submanifold of Θ∗ of dimension I + 1, and, since ϕ1 is a diﬀeomorphism,
its image under ϕ1 forms a submanifold of P∗ of lower dimension than P∗. For every
i, we can therefore eliminate from P∗ the points (e, c) = ϕ1(θ) that satisfy Ri(θ) = 0
for some θ ∈ Θ∗. Write P∗∗ for the resulting open subset of P. By construction, P∗∗
is a submanifold of P of the same dimension as P. Moreover, P∗∗ diﬀers from P by
a closed set of measure zero, and si(ci,2) and si(ci,3) never coincide for any i on P∗∗.
4.5. Eﬃcient Equilibria are Non-Generic
We are now ready to complete the proof of our generic ineﬃciency result. A convenient
way to describe the set of eﬃcient equilibrium allocations deÞned by (25)-(26) and
(30) is obtained by eliminating the Pareto weights and shadow prices. This gives: Dui(ci,2)− φDui(ci,1)Dui(ci,3)− ψDui(ci,2)
D2ui(ci,3)− ξD2ui(ci,2)
 = 0 (32)
for all i and t, and some (φ,ψ, ξ) ∈ R3++, together with the feasibility conditions:
et −
IX
i=1
ci,t = 0 (33)
for all t. Given a vector of aggregate endowments e, we have to solve for the consump-
tion allocation c and (φ,ψ, ξ). Note that (32)-(33) is a system of 3(I + 1) equations
and 3(I + 1) unknowns. Diﬀerentiating the LHS of (32) with respect to (ci,φ,ψ, ξ)
and scaling the tth row of the derivative by Dui(ci,t) yields:
£
Ai B
¤
=

−D2ui(ci,1)
Dui(ci,1)
D2ui(ci,2)
Dui(ci,2)
0 −φ−1 0 0
0 −D2ui(ci,2)
Dui(ci,2)
D2ui(ci,3)
Dui(ci,3)
0 −ψ−1 0
0 −D3ui(ci,2)
D2ui(ci,2)
D3ui(ci,3)
D2ui(ci,3)
0 0 −ξ−1
 .
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The derivative of the LHS of (32) and (33) therefore has the same rank as:
0 A1 0 · · · 0 B
0 0
. . . 0
...
...
...
...
. . . AI−1 0 B
0 0 · · · 0 AI B
I3 −I3 · · · −I3 −I3 0
 . (34)
Suppose now that we restrict attention to economies in:
W = R3(I+1)++ \ [P\P∗∗] .
W is submanifold of R3(I+1)++ of dimension 3(I + 1), and diﬀering from R
3(I+1)
++ by a
closed set of measure zero. The determinant of Ai is given by:
D2ui(ci,1)
Dui(ci,1)
D2ui(ci,2)
Dui(ci,2)
D2ui(ci,3)
Dui(ci,3)
[si(ci,3)− si(ci,2)] .
The strict concavity of ui implies that this is zero if and only if si(ci,3) = si(ci,2).
But this cannot happen on W for any i. Thus all the Ai are non-singular on W .
This implies that (34) has full rank. Therefore zero is a regular value of the map
deÞned by (32)-(33). The Transversality Theorem implies that for generic endow-
ments e, eﬃcient equilibrium allocations c are isolated. We have proved the following
proposition.
Proposition 5 Under Assumptions S and Z, the sets of date-1 Pareto eﬃcient and
equilibrium allocations intersect only at isolated points, except for economies with
endowments in a closed set of measure zero.
The underlying intuition for the importance of homotheticity is easy to see. Note
that (29) can be expressed using the marginal propensity to consume out of date-2
wealth as:
p2
p1
=
µ
Dwci,2(p, w2) δ1 + (1−Dwci,2(p, w2)) δ2
δ1
¶
Dui(ci,2(p, w2))
Dui(ci,1(p, w1))
.
This is the generalized Euler equation of Harris and Laibson (2001). Date-1 eﬃciency
requires that the date-2 consumption functions of all consumers have the same slope
in equilibrium. Proposition 5 shows that this can hold generically only for the linear
consumption functions implied by homothetic preferences.
5. Concluding Remarks
Renegotiation-proofness is a benchmark for eﬃciency in an economy in which it is
not possible to commit not to renegotiate. One would expect renegotiation-proof
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allocations to arise in an environment in which a contract is enforced unless all parties
to the contract agree to re-write it, and in which bargaining is eﬃcient. Our results
show that a sequence of competitive markets with or without lotteries need not achieve
this benchmark of eﬃciency.10 An interesting open question is: are there decentralized
mechanisms, other than a complete set of date-1 markets, that do?
We have focussed on exchange economies. The example of Krusell, Kurus¸çu, and
Smith (2001) shows that the competitive equilibrium in a production economy with
identical consumers and homothetic preferences can yield a higher level of utility
to consumers at the initial date than does any renegotiation-proof allocation. Thus
renegotiation-proof allocations need no longer be Pareto eﬃcient from the perspec-
tive of consumers at the initial date. Instead, competitive markets generate a form
of commitment that makes these consumers better-oﬀ than when they have access
to eﬃcient centralized bargaining procedures. However, the use of homothetic pref-
erences in Krusell, Kurus¸çu, and Smith (2001) rules out the sort of ineﬃciency of
competitive markets that can occur even in an exchange economy. Clearly, a further
investigation of production economies is warranted.
Most of our results were shown for three-period economies. The beneÞt of this
assumption is that the date-2 consumer faces a standard concave decision problem.
This ensures that his optimal decision rules are continuous, and that there is no
loss of generality in focusing on Markov perfect equilibria for which current wealth
is the state variable. It is unclear whether this Markov structure can be carried
over into more general multiperiod economies (see Peleg and Yaari (1973)), although
allowing for randomization or lotteries, as we do here, may help in this respect. Our
preliminary investigations suggest that considering the whole set of subgame perfect
equilibria of the intrapersonal game (in line with Goldman (1980)) may also be a
fruitful avenue of research.
A Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium
Proof of Lemma 2. Note Þrst that, since consumer i cannot spend his wealth twice,
and ui is increasing, we obtain, for all (p,w2) ∈ P ×R++:
Vi(p,w2) ≤ (δ1 + δ2) ui
µ
w2
µ
1 + max
p∈P
½
p2
p3
¾¶¶
. (35)
Thus, by Assumption U, limw2→∞ Vi(p, w2)/w2 = 0, and limw2→0+ Vi(p, w2) = −∞
whenever ui is unbounded below. For any given (p, w1) ∈ P × Wi,1, the date-1
10This is in contrast to the situation in economies with private information where lotteries can
achieve constrained eﬃcient allocations (see Prescott and Townsend (1984) and Kehoe, Levine and
Prescott (2002)).
23
consumer is faced with the following decision problem:
sup
(c1,µ)∈R+×∆(R+)
½
ui(c1) +
Z
Vi(p, w2) dµ(w2) : p1c1 + p2
Z
w2 dµ(w2) ≤ p1w1
¾
. (36)
This can also be represented as a two-step decision problem:
sup
(c1,w¯2)∈R2+
{ui(c1) + vi(p, w¯2) : p1c1 + p2w¯2 ≤ p1w1} , (37)
where the value function vi : P ×R+ → R is given by the least concave supremum of
Vi(p, ·):
vi(p, w¯2) = sup
µ∈∆(R+)
½Z
Vi(p, w2) dµ(w2) :
Z
w2 dµ(w2) = w¯2
¾
, (38)
It follows from Caratheodorys Theorem that vi can in turn be represented as:
vi(p, w¯2) = sup
(x,y)∈R2+
½µ
y − w¯2
y − x
¶
Vi(p, x) +
µ
w¯2 − x
y − x
¶
Vi(p, y) : x ≤ w¯2 ≤ y
¾
(39)
(see Rockafellar (1970, Corollary 17.1.5)). Let w¯max2 = maxp∈P{p1/p2}maxWi,1.
We Þrst prove that there exists some ymax ∈ R++ such that, for any (p, w¯2) ∈
P × (0, w¯max2 ], any sequence {(xn, yn)} that approximates (39) can be replaced by
a sequence {(xn, y0n)} such that {y0n} is bounded above by ymax. Fix some w∗2 > w¯max2 .
Without loss of generality, we may assume that Vi(p,w∗2) is positive and thus bounded
away from zero for all p ∈ P . By (35), there exists some ymax > w∗2 such that:
min
½
Vi(p, w
∗
2)
w∗2
, min
x∈[0,w¯max2 ]
½
Vi(p, w
∗
2)− Vi(p, x)
w∗2 − x
¾¾
≥ Vi(p, y)
y − w∗2
(40)
for all (p, y) ∈ P × [ymax,∞). Consider a sequence {(xn, yn)} that approximates (39)
and suppose that for some n, yn > ymax. Change the lottery with support {xn, yn}
and expectation w¯2 to a lottery with support {xn, w∗2} and the same expectation. The
resulting change in the objective of (39) is given by:
(w¯2 − xn)
µ
Vi(p, w
∗
2)
w∗2 − xn
− Vi(p, yn)
yn − xn −
(yn − w∗2) Vi(p, xn)
(yn − xn)(w∗2 − xn)
¶
,
and this is strictly positive by (40), independently of the sign of Vi(p, xn). If ui is
bounded below, this proves the result since one can choose Ci,1 = [0,maxWi,1] and
Wi,2 = [0, y
max], and (37)-(38) is reduced to a compact continuous decision problem.
Suppose now that ui is not bounded below. It is easy to see that the value of (37) must
be bounded away from −∞ on P ×Wi,1, and, from (35), that one need only consider
c1 ∈ [cmin1 ,maxWi,1] and w¯2 ∈ [w¯min2 , w¯max2 ] for some cmin1 > 0 and w¯min2 > 0. We now
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prove that there exists some xmin ∈ R++ such that, for any (p, w¯2) ∈ P × [w¯min2 , w¯max2 ],
any sequence {(xn, yn)} (with yn ≤ ymax) that approximates (39) can be replaced by
a sequence {(x0n, yn)} such that {x0n} is bounded below by xmin. Fix some w∗∗2 <
w¯min2 . Without loss of generality, we may assume that Vi(p,w
∗∗
2 ) is negative and thus
bounded away from zero for all p ∈ P . By (35), there exists some xmin < w∗∗2 such
that:
min
½
Vi(p, w
∗∗
2 )
w¯min2 − w∗∗2
, min
y∈[w¯min2 ,ymax]
½
Vi(p, w
∗∗
2 )− Vi(p, y)
y − w∗∗2
¾¾
≥ Vi(p, x)
ymax − x (41)
for all (p, x) ∈ P × (0, xmin]. Consider a sequence {(xn, yn)} that approximates (39)
and suppose that for some n, xn < xmin. Change the lottery with support {xn, yn}
and expectation w¯2 to a lottery with support {w∗∗2 , yn} and the same expectation.
The resulting change in the objective of (39) is given by:
(yn − w¯2)
µ
Vi(p, w
∗∗
2 )
yn − w∗∗2
− Vi(p, xn)
yn − xn −
(w∗∗2 − xn) Vi(p, yn)
(yn − xn)(yn − w∗∗2 )
¶
which is strictly positive by (41), independently of the sign of Vi(p, yn). This proves
the result, since one can choose Ci,1 = [cmin1 ,maxWi,1] and Wi,2 = [x
min, ymax], and
(37)-(38) is reduced to a compact continuous decision problem.
B Smooth Preferences
Proof of Lemma 4. Since g is a one-to-one mapping, we need only check that it
is a local diﬀeomorphism. Taking the gradient of (25)-(26) and using the Implicit
Function Theorem yields:·
Dct(et,λ)
Dpt(et,λ)
¸
= −
·
diag[λD2u] −ι
−ι0 0
¸−1 ·
0 diag[Du]
1 0
¸
, (42)
where ι denotes the unit vector of RI . Write h = [h1, . . . , hI ]0 with:
hi =
Dui(ci,t)
D2ui(ci,t)
evaluated at the date-t allocation speciÞed by g(et,λ). Using (42), one may then
verify that Dg(et,λ) can be expressed as:
Dg(et,λ) =
·
1 0
(ι0h)−1h −diag[h] + (ι0h)−1 hh0
¸ ·
1 0
0 diag[λ]
¸−1
. (43)
By the Inverse Function Theorem, it is enough to prove that Dg(et,λ) induces an
isomorphism between the tangent space of R×∆I and F . For any given (x¯, y¯) ∈ F ,
this amounts to examining the solutions in {y ∈ RI : ι0y = 0} to:
a¯ ≡ y¯ − x¯(ι0h)−1h =
³
−diag[h] + (ι0h)−1 hh0
´
diag[λ]−1y.
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The one-dimensional linear space of solutions can be parameterized as y(ζ) = ζλ+ya¯,
where λ0ya¯ = 0. Imposing the additional restriction that ι0a¯ = 0 implies ζ = −ι0ya¯.
Therefore Dg(et,λ) has a unique inverse when restricted to the tangent space of
R×∆I , which implies the result.
Proof of Proposition 4. Necessary conditions for a competitive equilibrium allo-
cation c without lotteries are given by (30) together with the budget constraints:
3X
t=1
pt (ei,t − ci,t) = 0 (44)
for all i, and the market clearing conditions:
IX
i=1
(ei,t − ci,t) = 0 (45)
for all t. By Walras Law, one of the market clearing conditions or budget constraints
is redundant. Homogeneity of the budget constraints implies that p can be normalized
in an arbitrary way. We normalize prices to satisfy p0p/2 = 1. Write K(e, c,λ, p) = 0
for (30)-(44)-(45). The derivative DK(e, c,λ, p) is given by:
0 · · · 0 λ1Dm1(c1) 0 0 m1(c1) 0 0 −I3
...
. . .
... 0
. . . 0 0
. . . 0
...
0 · · · 0 0 0 λIDmI(cI) 0 0 mI(cI) −I3
p0 0 0 −p0 0 0 0 · · · 0 (e1 − c1)0
0
. . . 0 0
. . . 0
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 p0 0 0 −p0 0 · · · 0 (eI − cI)0
I3 · · · I3 −I3 · · · −I3 0 · · · 0 0
0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0 p0

.
For DK(e, c,λ, p) to have full rank (taking into account Walras law), it is suﬃcient
that for all i, the 3× 4 matrix: £
mi(ci) Dmi(ci)
¤
(46)
be of rank 3. It is easy to verify that, for this to hold, we need the following matrix
to have rank 2:·
1 1 + hi(ci,2, ci,3) (si(ci,2)− 2) −hi(ci,2, ci,3) (si(ci,3)− 2)
1 hi(ci,2, ci,3) (si(ci,2)− 2) 1− hi(ci,2, ci,3) (si(ci,3)− 2)
¸
, (47)
where the function hi is deÞned by:
hi(x, y) =
(δ2 − δ21) fi(x, y) [Dui(y)]
2
D2ui(y)³
δ1
[Dui(x)]2
D2ui(x)
+ δ2
[Dui(y)]2
D2ui(y)
´2 .
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This is indeed the case, since neither of the second two columns of (47) can be zero
or proportional to the Þrst column. Since K(e, c,λ, p) = 0 implies that DK(e, c,λ, p)
has full rank (taking into account Walras Law), the Transversality Theorem implies
that for generic endowments, zero is a regular value of K(e, ·, ·, ·) and therefore that
any solution to (30)-(44)-(45) is locally unique.
Proof of Lemma 5. Note that DRi(θ) = Dri(e, c)Dϕ1(θ) for (e, c) = ϕ1(θ) and
θ = (e1, c1, e−1). Since c ∈ C whenever θ ∈ Θ∗, Dri(e, c) 6= 0. Consider varying the
e−1-component of θ. Since (e1, c1) is Þxed, λ = l(c1) must be Þxed. Thus we are to
investigate changes in (ci,2, ci,3) as (e2, e3) varies for Þxed λ. Eﬃciency requires that
consumption of all consumers co-moves strictly with the aggregate. Indeed, it follows
from (43) that Detci,t(et,λ) = (ι
0h)−1hi, where hi < 0. Thus, by varying (e2, e3) in
arbitrary directions, one can vary (ci,2, ci,3) in arbitrary directions for each i. This
means that one can Þnd a linear combination of the columns of Dϕ1(θ) that is not
orthogonal to Dri(e, c). It follows that DRi(θ) 6= 0, as claimed.
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